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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
There have been two main traditions in the study of language in modern times. The
first is the tradition of "universal" or "philosophical grammar," which flourished in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in intimate connection with philosophy and specu-
lative psychology. The second is the tradition of modern linguistics, a nineteenth and
twentieth century phenomenon that was also closely interwoven with the philosophy, psy-
chology, and anthropology of its day. Philosophical grammar was concerned with
general, universal principles of language structure; it attempted to ground these prin-
ciples in a theory of mental processes, and to illustrate them with detailed study of par-
ticular languages. By modern standards, the work lacked care and attention to detail,
and the conclusions that were reached, though often highly insightful, were deficient in
empirical support and sharpness of formulation. In comparison, modern nineteenth and
twentieth century linguistics has achieved a much higher standard of rigor, and has accu-
mulated linguistic data of an incomparably greater scope and variety. It has been limited,
however, by a much narrower interpretation of the purposes and goals of linguistic
science. It has eschewed theory construction in favor of elaboration of methods of
analysis, and it has not been concerned with linguistic universals - often, in fact, it has
denied that there are, in any significant sense, genuine and deep universal principles
that constrain the form and use of human language.
The work in linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology represents, in a
sense, a synthesis of these two major traditions. In terms of its general goals and even
many of its specific hypotheses, this work has a very classical flavor. But in the range
and reliability of evidence and precision of formulation, this work accepts and attempts
to surpass the standards of modern structuralism.
For classical linguistics, a central property of human language is what we can call
its "creative" aspect, that is, its unboundedness and freedom from stimulus control.
Under ordinary circumstances, what a person says is not determined by the stimuli that
impinge on him or by identifiable physiological states, to any significant degree. The
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unboundedness of normal language is evident from the fact that almost every linguistic
utterance produced and understood is quite new, not similar in any physically defined
sense to those that have been produced in the past experience of the language user, and
not conforming to familiar or memorized patterns, in any meaningful sense of the notion
"pattern." Nor are these utterances "generalizations" from past experience, in any
sense of "generalization" known to psychology or philosophy. Nor can language use be
described in terms of "habits" or "repertoires of responses." In recognizing these facts,
philosophical grammar was entirely correct and to the point.
To account for this creative aspect of normal language use, we must attribute to the
language user knowledge of a certain organized system of rules that establish a sound-
meaning relation for an infinite class of sentences. This knowledge is, of course, quite
unconscious, but it is nonetheless perfectly real. Thus it is quite likely that no one
reading this report has ever seen, heard, or produced the sentence
(1) What disturbed John was being disregarded by everyone.
Yet every reader will understand that the sentence may be roughly paraphrased by either
(2) or (3):
(2) Everyone was disregarding the thing that disturbed John.
(3) The fact that everyone was disregarding him disturbed John.
Thus sentence (1) is ambiguous, its possible interpretations being (2) or (3). If the word
"our" is inserted in (1), giving (4), the sentence is unambiguous.
(4) What disturbed John was our being disregarded by everyone.
The interpretation of (4) can only be along the lines of (3), with "him" replaced by "us."
Or, to choose an example from a totally different sphere of language, speakers of English
would know that the plural of the word dap is daps, whereas that of linch is linches (with
es rather that s), in spite of the fact that most of the speakers would neither know the
meanings of these words nor have heard them before.
A speaker of English has knowledge of these facts and numerous others without having
been exposed to these sentences or to any explicit "teaching." He has mastered a system
of rules that determine both the phonetic form of sentences (1)-(4) and their various
semantic interpretations. The first task of the linguist who is investigating the structure
of English is to try to determine this system of rules, the system that is called the " gen-
erative grammar of English." This generative grammar has in some manner been inter-
nalized by every speaker of English; it determines the pairing of sound and meaning for
an indefinitely large range of possible sentences. It is this internalized generative gram-
mar that makes possible the normal, "creative" use of language.
The discovery of the generative grammar of English, and other languages, is, how-
ever, only the first task that faces the linguist. To the extent that such grammars have
been developed and validated, the linguist can then turn to the question of how they are
put to use, by the speaker or hearer, in normal conversation, in literature, in internal
monologue, and so on. Furthermore, he can turn to the basic problem of classical lin-
guistics: What are the universal principles that limit the form of such generative gram-
mars? Clearly, there must be universal principles with a very narrow and limiting
character. If this were not true, it would be impossible for the child, presented with
scattered samples of a language for an extremely short period, to determine for himself
the generative grammar of this language. But this is a task that normal humans accom-
plish with great facility. This indicates that they must approach the task forearmed with
highly specific advance knowledge (obviously, unconscious) of the possible form that a
generative grammar must assume. To put it loosely, although the child cannot "know"
in advance whether the language to which he is exposed is English, Chinese, and so on,
he must "know" that it is a "human language" of a highly special sort, which can only
vary in very restricted ways. The problem of "universal grammar," now, as in the
seventeenth century, is to determine the principles that limit the variety of human lan-
guage and make possible the acquisition of language. To the extent that such principles
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can be formulated and validated, we gain insight of an unparalleled kind into the innately
determined character of human mental processes.
We feel that recent work, much of it carried out at M. I. T. , makes it possible to
formulate a fairly precise theory of universal grammar in this sense, a theory which is,
furthermore, reasonably well supported by substantial empirical evidence from a variety
of languages. The major goal of our research, then, is to sharpen and deepen the theory
of generative grammar, and to use it as a basis for the study of cognitive processes.
Since many of the problems of language lie in the area in which several disciplines
overlap, an adequate and exhaustive treatment of language demands close cooperation
of linguistics with other sciences. The inquiry into the structural principles of human
language suggests a comparison of these principles with those of other sign systems,
which, in turn, leads naturally to the elaboration of a general theory of signs, semiotics.
Here linguistics touches upon problems that have been studied by philosophy. Other
problems of interest to logicians - and also to mathematicians - are touched upon in the
studies devoted to the formal features of a general theory of language. The study of
language in its poetic function brings linguistics into contact with the theory and history
of literature. The social function of language cannot be properly illuminated without
the help of anthropologists and sociologists. The problems that are common to lin-
guistics and the theory of communication, the psychology of language, the acoustics and
physiology of speech, and the study of language disturbances are too well known to need
further comment here. The exploration of these interdisciplinary problems, a major
objective of this group, will be of benefit not only to linguistics; it is certain to pro-
vide workers in the other fields with stimulating insight and new methods of attack, as
well as to suggest to them new problems for investigation and fruitful reformulations of
questions that have been asked for a long time.
M. Halle, N. A. Chomsky
A. ON INSTRUMENTAL ADVERBS AND THE
CONCEPT OF DEEP STRUCTURE
In a very interesting paper Lakoffl presents evidence that he takes to indicate that
either the notion of deep structure (as defined by Katz and Postal 2 and by Chomsky3 )
must be abandoned or it must be considerably revised toward abstractness Lakoff' s
arguments demand the attention of anyone concerned with the theoretical basis of syntax,
for they support the "universal base hypothesis." This is the thesis that the base com-
ponents of all natural languages are essentially identical, containing only a few syntactic
categories (e. g., S, NP, VP) and intimately related to semantic interpretation; the
multiplicity of categories actually appearing in languages (e. g. , Prepositional Phrase,
Auxiliary, Manner Adverb, Instrumental Adverb, Particle, Adjective), in this view, is
a surface phenomenon to be transformationally derived. In this report, I attempt to show
first, that Lakoff's evidence does not support his conclusion in the case of instrumental
adverbs, and second, that the category 'Instrumental Adverb' must be present in deep
structure.
Lakoff centers his argument around the two sentences
a) Seymour sliced the salami with a knife.
b) Seymour used a knife to slice the salami.
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He points out that in recent transformational practice a) and b) are assigned different
deep structures; but since deep structure is defined (in part) in terms of co-occurrence
and selectional restrictions and a) and b) share many selectional properties, one is
unable to state significant grammatical generalizations that can be captured if a) and b)
are given identical deep structures. If one can also show that a) is a transform of b),
then it is a consequence of Lakoff's proposal that the category Instrumental Adverb is
unnecessary. This consequence is part of the motivation for Lakoff's more general con-
clusions that in grammatical theory (i) "there would be many fewer grammatical cate-
gories and relations than had previously been believed," and (ii) "the deep structures for
sentences containing such adverbs would be more abstract (i. e. , farther removed from
surface structure) than had previously been thought." 4
Lakoff first claims that in recent practice a) and b) would be represented at the
level of deep structure by a') and b') (Diagram XXV-1). Presumably, the reason
a')
NP S VP
V NP INSTRUMENTAL ADVERB
P NP
SEYMOUR SLICED THE SALAMI WITH A KNIFE
b )
NP SVP
V N P S
NP VP
V NP
SEYMOUR USED A KNIFE SEYMOUR SLICED THE SALAMI
Diagram XXV- 1.
for placing Seymour as subject of the embedded S in b') rather than knife is that
we have
Seymour used a knife to cut himself
but not
*Seymour used a knife to cut itself.
QPR No. 92 366
(XXV. LINGUISTICS)
Lakoff notices 5 that
*Seymour cut the knife with itself
is also inadmissible, and takes this as evidence for the similarity of a) and b) at the
deep-structure level. Otherwise, he claims, new constraints between the objects of
a verb and the objects in an instrumental would be required. Such constraints Lakoff
finds "exceedingly strange." There is independent evidence, however, for the existence
of such constraints, or very similar ones. Consider first the verb call. (These
examples are to be understood in the sense of call which requires a for-dative; the other
sense, in which call has two direct objects, is not relevant.)
Seymour called me a porter
=Seymour called a porter for me.
But we do not have the following sentences in the same sense:
*Seymour called me myself
=*Seymour called me for myself.
Similarly, we have
Seymour brought Henry a concubine,
but not
*Seymour brought Henry himself
=*Seymour brought Henry for himself.
The last sentences are good if himself refers to Seymour, but inadmissible if himself
means Henry. In this respect, the instrumental phrase behaves as an indirect or oblique
object of the verb. With- and for-phrases of this kind (dative or instrumental) are
strikingly different from other phrases, and surely must be treated in special ways; for
example, the rule interpreting nonintensive reflexive pronouns within such phrases may
have to operate across a verb (that is, the antecedent of an oblique noun phrase in a verb
phrase may have to lie outside that verb phrase).
Lakoff states that the deep structures of a') and b') have "little or nothing in com-
mon." Observe, however, that in effect the deep structure of sentence a) is itself pres-
ent as an embedding in the deep structure of b). There is some evidence that even the
instrumental of a) is present in b): in many dialects there occur sentences like
Seymour used a knife to slice the salami with.
This sentence is not from the deep structure with a relative clause in knife: compare
Seymour got a knife to slice the salami with
=Seymour got a knife with which to slice the salami,
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and
Seymour used a knife to slice the salami with
-*Seymour used a knife with which to slice the salami.
If a) and b) are related by embedding, then one would expect to find partial similarities
and some differences. I need not argue for the existence of similarities, since Lakoff
presents many. But there are interesting differences between a) and b) which Lakoff
neglects to mention.
Consider, for example, Lakoff's statement that a) and b) are synonymous.6 In fact,
given the theoretical assumptions Lakoff accepts for the purposes of his argument
(namely, that semantic interpretation is defined on deep structure in the usual way and
that transformations preserve semantic interpretation), if a) and b) have the same
deep structure, then it is necessary that they be synonymous. On the other hand, if
they differ in some way in deep structure it is not necessary for them to have the same
meaning. Instead, one might expect differences traceable to the presence of the verb
use in b) and its absence in a). But there are some such differing selectional
properties:
(i) All at once Seymour broke the door open with a bat
is not synonymous with
(ii) 'All at once Seymour used a bat to break the door open;
(iii) Seymour finally managed to open the door with his penknife
is not synonymous with
(iv) 'Seymour finally managed to use his penknife to open the door;
(v) Seymour rapidly sliced the salami with a knife
is not synonymous with the following
(vi) ''Seymour rapidly used a knife to slice the salami,
and no permutation of the adverb yields a synonymous S:
(vii) 'Seymour used a knife rapidly to slice the salami
(viii) Seymour used a knife to slice the salami rapidly
=Seymour used a knife to rapidly slice the salami;
sentence (viii) is quite different from (v), in that it means
(ix) In order to slice the salami rapidly, Seymour used a knife.
Whatever sense one gives to *using something rapidly (not: using something up rapidly),
it is not the same as slicing something rapidly. That is because special semantic
properties of use are showing up:
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I did a little slicing ...
*I did a little using ...
It is not at all surprising that the additional morphological material in b) should have
peculiar selectional properties; only if a) and b) were transforms of the same deep
structure would this fact be surprising and indeed inexplicable.
Thus I believe that Lakoff is in error when he writes that a) and b) are synonymous.
Under normal stress, a) and b) should be understood to be different by most speakers
of English.
The fact that sentences a) and b) differ in their selectional properties shows that
they are not identical at the level of deep structure, given the set of assumptions Lakoff
accepts in his paper. Therefore one cannot rely on "deep-structure constraints," as
Lakoff does, to account for the particular similarities of a) and b). How then are these
properties to be accounted for ? I shall construct an alternative treatment of one class
of examples discussed by Lakoff. For this class there is crucial evidence showing that
instrumental adverbs must be syntactically defined in deep structure rather than trans-
formationally derived.
One fact noticed by Lakoff is that sentences like
*Henry broke the window with a chisel with a hammer
are ill-formed. He relates this fact to the nonoccurrence of an instrumental reading
for sentences like this:
*Henry used a hammer to use a chisel to break the window.
Lakoff gives no motivation, however, for the nonoccurrence of the last type of sentence.
These facts are only superficially related; that is, they are an instance of a false gen-
eralization. For clearly there are limitations on the number and kind of adverbial
phrases associated with a given verb:
*Call me him a taxi
John called a taxi for me
*John called me a taxi a horse
John called a taxi a horse for me
*John sliced me a salami with a knife with a chisel
John knew ecstasy with Mary
*John knew the answer with a slide rule;
and it is possible, in fact necessary, to subcategorize verbs on this basis for lexical
insertion. I shall call verbs that take an instrumental I-type verbs. Apparently there
are no verbs with more than one instrumental object and this is evidently true about
datives, too (though conjoined oblique objects are possible). The fact about Instrumentals
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is expressed in the theory Lakoff rejects by the form of the Phrase Structure rules,
which make no provision for two Instrumental Adverbs within the same VP.
In accordance with the discussion above, figure out, but not know, is an I-type verb
because we have
John figured it out with a slide rule,
where the with-phrase is instrumental. I find no reason to label verbs like use, utilize,
make use of, employ I-type verbs, since there is no evidence that they take oblique
objects of the appropriate kind:
*Use it with a slide rule;
it is necessary to exclude the interpretation "along with a slide rule," which is not an
instrumental sense.
The I-verb category is useful in describing the following fact: When use (and more
generally, use-verbs) has a verb-phrase complement of a particular type (not an
in order to clause, but a resultative clause), the embedded verb must be an I-type verb.
I shall refer to this as Condition I.
A rough criterion for distinguishing in order to clauses from resultative clauses is
a paraphrase. (By a "paraphrase" I mean something expressing part but not neces-
sarily all of the meaning of something else.) The sentence
She used a sexy dress to attract him
may be paraphrased as
She used a sexy dress in attracting him;
but in general, in order to clauses cannot be so paraphrased;
She dressed nicely to please her mother
#'She dressed nicely in pleasing her mother.
It would be desirable to have a firm, syntactic characterization of "resultative clause,"
but I have not yet found one. For the purposes of this report, I have accepted the para-
phrase criterion that Lakoff uses, although I do not believe it is entirely reliable.
Consequently, we may say that the sentence
Seymour used a knife to slice the salami
contains a resultative clause:
Seymour used a knife in slicing the salami;
furthermore, it satisfies Condition I, for slice is an I-type verb. But a verb like know,
which takes no Instrument, would cause Condition I to be violated:
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*Seymour used a knife to know the salami,
or perhaps more credibly,
*Seymour used a slide rule to know the answer.
A further consequence of Condition I is that sentences of the type
*Melvin used a hammer to use a chisel to break the window
are ill-formed (cf. Lakoff7), for use is not an I-type verb; in other words, using some-
thing cannot be the result of using that something. Compare:
Seymour used a knife to get the salami sliced.
We see why Condition I is defined in terms of syntactic rather than solely seman-
tic features: a plausible case can be made for use having the semantic feature
[+Instrumental]; nevertheless, use must be excluded from Resultative clauses after use-
type verbs. Only a (syntactic) subcategorization like the one I have sketched can single
out the appropriate class of verbs satisfying Condition I, the I-type verbs. Lakoff handles
the problem of multiple embedding of use-verbs by an ad hoc constraint; he employs
an entirely different constraint to rule out know from embedding in sentences like b).
This other constraint, which uses a semantic feature, is incorrect, as I shall show.
Condition I is rather natural: it specifies that the result of using an instrument
must be something that it is possible to do with an instrument. (Moreover, the same
instrument must be involved; this condition would allow one to formulate deletion con-
ditions in case instrumental phrases, in addition to the I-type verbs, actually occur in
S below use.) Condition I relates the constructions exemplified in sentences a) and b)
in a natural way: if a) were out, then b) would be out, for if a) were out, slice would
not be an I-type verb.
Thus far, I have only shown that this condition could be used to account for the non-
occurrence of sentences like
(i) *Seymour used a slide rule to know the answer
given the nonoccurrence of sentences like
(ii) *Seymour knew the answer with a slide rule.
I have not yet shown that some such condition is necessary. I shall give crucial cases
favoring a condition defined in terms of I-type verbs over the semantic feature treat-
ment that Lakoff presents. The necessity for a Condition I will then entail the necessity
for a nonsemantic characterization of instrumentals.
Lakoff claims that in both constructions
c) Someone V' d something with some instrument
d) Someone used some instrument to V something
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V must be [+Activity]. He states that if d) has a deep structure like that of b'), then
the nonoccurrence of sentences like (i) could be accounted for "by a constraint between
the verb 'use' and the next lowest verb in its complement sentence. This is a [type of]
constraint needed elsewhere in English grammar. For example, the verbs force,
remember, try, etc., require an activity verb in their complements ... . But the real
problem here is not just whether a new type of constraint will have to be added to the
theory of grammar to handle [ii]. The real difficulty is that if [a] and [b] have essen-
tially different deep structures, then the constraints prohibiting [i] and [ii] will have to
be entirely different constraints. In one case we would have a constraint between a verb
and a type of adverbial. In the other case, we would have a constraint between two
verbs."8 [Lakoff's references have been renumbered.]
I have presented evidence that a) and b) do not have the same deep structure. There-
fore Lakoff's conclusion, just quoted, that the constraints prohibiting (i) and (ii) are
"entirely different," would seem to follow and a significant grammatical generalization
would seem to be incapable of formulation within present theory. But this unpleasant
consequence does not follow, for the verb-verb constraint Lakoff describes is an incor-
rect expression of the "generalization." Since a) and b) do not have the same deep
structure, Lakoff' s argument quoted above actually demonstrates the defect in his treat-
ment: it fails to relate a) and b) significantly.
Condition I claims that the verbs embedded in resultative clauses below use must be
I-type verbs. Lakoff' s constraint claims that such verbs must be [+Activity]. Consider
an activity verb that is not an I-type verb, for example, the verb consider. Consider
is [+Activity], presumably, because one can say
I forced John to consider the alternatives;
and in reply to the question What were you doing all morning? one can say
I was considering learning Greek.
But consider is not an I-type verb; one cannot say in an instrumental sense
*I considered it with a book
my mind
fa computer.
The occurrence of sentences like
I considered slicing the salami with a book
my mind
ta computer
shows only that slice is an I-type verb. Though one can ask What did you slice the
salami with? one cannot ask in the same sense *What did you consider the alternatives
with? Lakoff' s condition would thus fail to exclude consider from a use-construction,
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but Condition I would have the correct consequences:
*I used a book to consider it (with)
*I used a book to consider slicing the salami (with).
A small sample of similar non I-type verbs which by Lakoff' s criteria are activity verbs
would include divulge, entertain the thought, learn, discuss, and, of course, the use-
verbs themselves.
Are there I-type verbs that are not activity verbs? I suspect that verbs taking
instrumentals are redundantly "activities" of one sort or another; that is, I would guess
that the I-type verbs are a proper subset of the activity verbs. But "activity" is still too
heterogeneous and loosely defined to be certain. Nevertheless, if there are nonactivity
verbs that are also I-type and fail to occur in resultative clauses below use, this would
show at most that Lakoff's constraint and Condition I intersect; that is, the verb use
obeys both conditions. In this case it is still Condition I that expresses the relation
between constructions of the forms a) and b).
There is an interesting set of verbs which provides additional evidence for the
necessity of a condition like I. These verbs have two senses, one [+Activity] but
non I-type; the other, [+Achievement] and I-type. (For this or a similar notion
of "achievement," see Vendler. 9 ) Examples are swim, run, climb. Consider first
swim. One can say
I spent the morning swimming in a mudhole
I forced Henry to swim every morning for a month and it did wonders
for his asthma
Paris remembered to swim and saved himself from drowning thereby.
In this activity sense of swim one cannot use instrumentals:
*He spent the morning swimming in a mudhole with a breaststroke.
*I forced Henry to use a breaststroke to swim (with).
In the sentence
Paris remembered to swim with a breaststroke and saved himself
from drowning
with a breaststroke is not an instrumental, but a manner adverbial. It is important to
distinguish the senses of with that indicate manner, accoutrement, or accompaniment
from the instrumental sense, just as one must distinguish resultative from in order to-
clauses. I shall give examples of this difference.
But there is a sense of swim which does allow instrumental adverbials; this sense
usually requires an object and suggests completed action, or "achievement":
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Archaeological evidence has shown that someone swam the Hellespont
with a breaststroke.
He used a breaststroke to swim the Hellespont.
He used a breaststroke in swimming the Hellespont.
The verb run is similar. In its activity sense it cannot occur with instrumentals:
He runs with special racing shoes (=accoutrement)
He uses special racing shoes to run (=in order to)
'He uses special racing shoes in running (=accoutrement).
But in its achievement sense, run does seem to be I-type:
He plans to run the race with special racing shoes
and therefore we have
He plans to use special racing shoes to run the race.
He plans to use special racing shoes in running the race.
The verb climb is quite analogous:
He climbed Mt. Everest with Marvel crampons
He used Marvel crampons to climb Mt. Everest.
He used Marvel crampons in climbing Mt. Everest.
But in its activity sense, we have
The last time he was seen, he was climbing with
Marvel crampons (=accoutrement)
He was forced to use Marvel crampons to climb (=in order to)
*She begged him to use Marvel crampons to climb;
the last is completely out if he is understood as the subject of to climb, though it may
be possible to impose an in order to interpretation on it otherwise.
The achievement senses of swim, run, and climb should be compared with win:
He won the race with a breaststroke
special racing shoes
Marvel crampons.
It goes without saying that ConditionI is just a hypothesis; one could easily falsify
it in obvious ways, for example, by finding a verb that cannot take instrumentals but
can occur in resultative clauses below use-type verbs. I have only sketched out the
condition to show how I believe the facts Lakoff discusses may be successfully handled
without abandoning the notion of deep structure or rendering it radically abstract.
If Condition I is correct, then it is clear that Lakoff has noticed several false
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generalizations, which are merely his hypotheses for describing significantly related
facts. I do not deny that the facts Lakoff presents are significantly related: he has per-
suasively shown the need for a deeper treatment of selectional restrictions.
Joan W. Bresnan
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